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RECENT CHANGES IN THE POSSESSIONS
CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION:
THEIR EFFICACY AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO PUERTO
RICO'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Section 9361 of the Internal Revenue Code deals with the pos-
sessions corporation 2 system of taxation. Under this system, domes-
tic corporations that operate in United States possessions3 and that
meet certain requirements receive substantial tax benefits. In pass-
ing section 936 and its predecessor,4 Congress hoped to promote
business and to encourage investment activity within United States
possessions.5 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
1. I.R.C. § 936 (1982).
2. The term "possessions corporation" refers to a corporation organized under the
laws of a state of the United States that qualifies for the benefits of section 936. Fre-
quently, large corporations operating in the United States own most, if not all, of a pos-
sessions corporation's stock. This relationship will be referred to throughout this Note as
a parent-subsidiary relationship. Subsidiary status, however, is not a prerequisite to
becoming a possessions corporation.
3. Under section 936, the term "United States possessions" includes the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, but does not include the Virgin Islands. I.R.C. § 936(d)(1) (1982).
See also H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 254, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3149.
4. Section 936's predecessor is section 931. Congress originally enacted section 931
as part of the Revenue Act of 1921. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-136, § 262,
42 Stat. 227, 271. The provisions of that Act dealing with possessions corporations
remained substantially unchanged until Congress promulgated section 936 as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90
Stat. 1525, 1643. Today, section 936 is the principal Internal Revenue Code section deal-
ing with possessions corporations.
As of June 1982, 807 corporations had elected section 936 status. Of this number, 619
engaged in manufacturing. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, FOURTH REPORT on THE OPERA-
TION AND EFFECT OF THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION 132 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP.].
5. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1051(b)-1051(c), 90 Stat.
1525, 1643. The Senate Finance Committee report dealing with the Tax Reform Act
stated:
The special exemption provided (under see. 931) in conjunction with investment
incentive programs established by possessions of the United States, especially the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, has been used as an inducement to U.S. corpo-
rate investment in active trades and businesses in Puerto Rico and the posses-
sions.... The committee after studying the problem concluded that it is
inappropriate to disturb the existing relationship between the possessions invest-
ment incentives and the U.S. tax laws because of the important role it is believed
they play in keeping investment in the possessions competitive with investment
in neighboring countries.
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 277-78, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3708.
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(TEFRA)6 amended section 936 and related code sections7 dealing
with possessions corporations in two ways. First, the Act provided
concrete rules for allocating income derived from intangibles 8 that
parent companies transfer to their possessions corporation subsidiar-
ies. Second, it required that possessions corporations derive sixty-
five percent of their gross income from active business operations
within a possession, rather than the fifty percent9 previously
required. The effect that these changes will have on operations in
possessions, particularly in Puerto Rico,' 0 is a matter of controversy.
There were two reasons for the section 936 amendments. Con-
gress perceived that parent corporations abused section 936 by trans-
ferring income-producing intangibles to their Puerto Rican
subsidiaries solely to take advantage of the section 936 tax credit. I
Moreover, it believed that the amendments would increase tax reve-
nues and would thereby help to reduce a burgeoning federal
deficit. 12
This Note evaluates the impact of the TEFRA amendments on
the possessions corporation system of taxation. First, the Note dis-
cusses the mechanics of section 936 and its predecessor and examines
Puerto Rico's tax treatment of possessions corporations. Second, it
discusses the 1982 changes and reviews the motivating factors
behind them. Third, it analyzes the relationship between Puerto
Rico's economic development and the possessions corporation sys-
tem. Fourth, the Note examines the efficacy of the TEFRA changes.
This examination reveals that modification of the possessions corpo-
ration system was not in the best interests of either the United States
6. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213, 96
Stat. 324, 452.
7. See I.R.C. § 246 (1982). Section 1504, another related Code section, was
amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 803(b)(3), 90 Stat. 1525,
1584. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
8. An intangible is "[p]roperty that is a 'right' rather than a physical object."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). For the purposes of this Note, rele-
vant intangibles include patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and formulas.
9. Under the original version of section 936, a corporation qualified for possessions
corporation status only if it derived at least 50% of its gross income from active business
operations. I.R.C. § 936(a)(2)(B) (1976). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 raised this requirement to 55% for the 1983 taxable year, to 60% for the 1984
taxable year, and to 65% for the taxable years thereafter. Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§§ 213(a)(l)(A)-213(a)(1)(C), 96 Stat. 324, 452 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 936(a)(2)(B)-
936(a)(2)(C) (1982)).
10. Most possessions corporations do business in Puerto Rico rather than in other
possessions because Puerto Rico provides tax exemptions from all or most of its income
taxes for a specific number of years. Thus, most possessions corporations find Puerto
Rico more attractive than other United States possessions. See Benjamin, TaxAspects of
Operating a Possessions Corporation in Puerto Rico, 2 INT'L TAX J. 197 (1975-76).
11. See infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
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or Puerto Rico. The Note therefore concludes that Congress should
have left section 936 unchanged.
I
HISTORY OF THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION
SYSTEM OF TAXATION
A full evaluation of the recent amendments to section 936
requires an understanding of the evolution and pre-TEFRA techni-
cal requirements of section 936. One must master section 936 and its
predecessor as well as Puerto Rico's tax treatment of possessions cor-
porations. This section reviews these areas.
A. SECTION 936's PREDECESSOR
Section 936 is best understood in light of the advantages and
technical requirements of its predecessor, section 931.13 To qualify
as a possessions corporation under that section, a corporation had to
meet two gross income tests: (1) eighty percent or more of its gross
income had to be from sources within a United States possession and
(2) fifty percent or more of the corporation's gross income had to
be from the active conduct of a trade or business within a United
States possession. 14 Moreover, a corporation had to meet both of
these tests for the three-year period ending with the close of the taxa-
ble year in question.15 If the corporation did not conduct business
within the possession or did not exist throughout this three-year
period, it had to meet both tests for the period in which it actually
did conduct business within a possession. 16 If a corporation met the
13. I.R.C. § 931 (1964 & Supp. IV 1966),prior to amendment by I.R.C. § 936 (1976).
14. I.R.C. §§ 931(a)(1)-931(a)(2) (1964), prior to amendment by I.R.C. § 936(a)(2)
(1976). To come within the purview of section 931, a corporation had to meet two opera-
tional requirements. First, at least 80% of the corporation's gross income had to derive
from sources within a possession. For purposes of this test, the income could derive from
more than one possession. Furthermore, gross income meant gross receipts less cost of
goods sold or, in the case of services such as assembly or packaging, gross income
equaled total revenues. See Rev. Rul. 74-374, 1974-2 C.B. 212-13. Second, at least 50%
of the corporation's gross income had to derive from the active conduct of a trade or
business within a single possession. The purpose of the 50% requirement was to insure
that possessions corporations achieved significant economic penetration of a possession.
Moreover, the purpose of the active trade or business requirement was to insure that
passive holding companies did not derive possessions corporation status. See generally
Hudson, Tax Exempt Corporations In Puerto Rico - An Overlooked Opportunity?, 31 U.
FLA. L. REv. 42, 45-48 (1978-79).
15. I.R.C. §§ 931(a)(l)-931(a)(2) (1964), prior to amendment by I.R.C. § 936(a)(2)
(1976).
16. The current version of section 93 I's so-called three-year rule states:
(a) GENERAL RULE.--In the case of individual citizens of the United States,
gross income means only gross income from sources within the United
States if the conditions of both paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) are
satisfied:
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two requirements, its foreign source and possession source income
(1) 3-YEAR PEROD.--If 80 percent or more of the gross income of such
citizen (computed without the benefit of this section) for the 3-year
period immediately preceding the close of the taxable year (or for such
part of such period immediately preceding the close of such taxable
year as may be applicable) was derived from sources within a posses-
sion of the United States; and
(2) TRADE OR BusINESS.--If 50 percent or more of his gross income (com-
puted without the benefit of this section) for such period or such part
thereof was derived from the active conduct of a trade or business
within a possession of the United States either on his own account or
as an employee or agent of another.
I.R.C. § 931(a)(1) (1982). The pre-1976 version of the three-year rule is similar to the
current version. Moreover, section 936 has a three-year rule virtually identical to that of
the current version of section 931. (The only significant difference is that section 936's
rule applies to domestic corporations rather than to individuals.) I.R.C. §§ 936(a)(2)(A) -
936(a)(2)(B) (1982).
Revenue Ruling 69-481 clarifies the operation of the three-year rule. Rev. Rul. 69-481,
1969-2 C.B. 156. In that ruling, an individual taxpayer requested advice as to whether he
satisfied the three-year rule for the taxable year ended December 31, 1966 and thus quali-
fied for tax benefits under the pre-1976 version of section 93 1(a). In commenting on that
rule, the Service stated:
For the purpose of determining the applicable period under section 93 1(a) of
the Code in the case of an individual who is employed in a United States posses-
sion and in the United States intermittently during the 3-year period immedi-
ately preceding the close of the taxable year, the expressions "such part of such
period immediately preceding the close of such taxable year as may be applica-
ble" and "such period or such part thereof' mean the portion of the 3-year
period immediately preceding the close of the taxable year in which the individ-
ual was employed in a possession of the United States, and not the full 3-year
period.
The individual must base his computation for the determination as to whether
his income meets the percentage requirements of section 931 (a) of the Code upon
his total income from all sources for those intervals constituting the applicable
period ....
Id at 157.
Because the language of section 936's three-year rule is virtually identical to that of the
pre-1976 version of section 931, Revenue Ruling 69-481 serves as a useful guide to inter-
preting section 936's three-year rule. Moreover, two other revenue rulings help clarify
the meaning of this rule. First, in the context of a pre-section 936 possessions corpora-
tion, Revenue Ruling 74-422 held that "[flor purposes of determining whether the gross
income requirements of section 93 1(a) of this Code are met, the three-year period begins
on the day a domestic corporation commences business operations in Puerto Rico." Rev.
Rul. 74-422, 1974-2 C.B. 213. Second, Revenue Ruling 65-260 held that the three-year
period referred to in the pre-1976 version of section 931(a) "means a period of 36 months
immediately preceeding the close of the taxable year." Rev. Rul. 65-260, 1965-2 C.B.
243.
Using the three revenue rulings as a guide, the following example illustrates the
mechanics of the three-year rule in the context of a section 936 corporation. Assume that
a United States corporation establishes a subsidiary on January 2, 1978 and on January
2, 1979 it establishes operations in Puerto Rico. The corporation seeks to obtain the
benefits of section 936 for the taxable year ending December 31, 1980. The corporation's
relevant financial data for the period from January 1978 to December 1979 are as
follows:
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was exempt from United States income tax. 17
Despite the existence of the tax exemption, possessions corpora-
tions seldom repatriated earnings, 18 for three reasons. First, parent
companies could not claim a dividends received deduction for any
earnings paid to them by possessions corporations. Instead, parent
companies had to pay a full tax on dividends. 19 Second, all income
earned by possessions corporations from foreign source investments
was exempt from United States taxes. 20 As a result, many posses-
sions corporations accumulated profits in Puerto Rico and then
invested the earnings outside the United States.21 Finally, a parent
company could obtain a possessions corporation's retained earnings
Location of Operations Source and Amount Total Income,
and Time Period of Income All Sources
United States 1978 United States $10,000 $10,000
Puerto Rico 1979 Puerto Rico $50,000 $50,000
Puerto Rico 1980 Puerto Rico $90,000 $90,000
Under Revenue Ruling 74-422, the three-year period begins on January 2, 1979, the day
the subsidiary commences operations in Puerto Rico. Even though the period from Jan-
uary 2, 1979 to December 31, 1980 does not constitute three years, the possessions corpo-
ration can nonetheless seek section 936 benefits. Revenue Ruling 69-481 supports this
conclusion. Under that ruling, the Service applied the "for such part of such period
immediately preceding the close of such taxable year as may be applicable" language of
section 931(a)(1) and held that the taxpayer qualified for section 931 benefits despite its
carrying on operations in a possession for less than thirty-six months. According to the
rationale of ruling 69-481, the taxpayer corporation in the example also meets both
income tests and thus qualifies for section 936 benefits.
17. A tax exemption differs substantially from a foreign tax credit. A section 931
exemption applies to all income of a possessions corporation, regardless of whether the
corporation actually incurred a foreign or possessions income tax. I.R.C. § 931 (1964 &
Supp. IV 1966), prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1051, 90 Stat. 1525, 1643. In contrast, a foreign tax credit shields a United States cor-
poration's earnings from income tax only to the extent the corporation pays tax to a
foreign government. See general I.R.C. § 901 (1982). In this way, a corporation doing
business abroad avoids double taxation.
18. For purposes of this Note, repatriation of earnings is a process in which posses-
sions corporations pay their profits to American investors either by dividend or liquida-
tion payments.
19. See I.R.C. § 243 (1982). This section allows domestic corporations to deduct
from their income at least 85% of the dividends they receive during the taxable year. But
the pre-1977 versions of section 246 disallowed parent corporations from taking such a
deduction. I.R.C. § 246(a)(2)(B) (1970),prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1525, 1643.
20. Under section 931, if a possessions corporation realized at least 80% of its gross
income from within one or more possessions and if 50% or more of its gross income was
from active business operations rather than passive investments, the corporation's foreign
source income escaped federal taxation. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
21. Often, for example, possessions corporations reinvested these excess funds in the
"Eurodollar" market either directly or through Guamanian banks. See TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT on THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE POS-
SESSIONS CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION 18-19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TREAS.
DEP'T SECOND ANN. REP.].
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tax-free by liquidating completely the possessions corporation. 22
Liquidation was, however, a harsh price to pay to repatriate earn-
ings. Thus, liquidation usually occurred only when a possessions
corporation's exemption from Puerto Rican taxes expired,23 or when
its need to repatriate the funds exceeded the benefits derived from
the continuation of section 931 status.
B. SECTION 936 AND RELATED CODE SECTIONS
During 1973 and 1974, Congress examined the efficacy of the
possessions corporation system of taxation. Congress, however,
enacted no reforms until 1976. In that year, Congress perceived two
substantial problems with section 931 and related code sections. Its
first concern was that allowing the foreign source income of posses-
sions corporations to escape taxation lacked justification. Congress
believed that neither the Puerto Rican economy nor the United
States Treasury benefited from these investments. 24 The investments
represented a revenue loss as well as an uneconomic use of a posses-
sions corporation's retained earnings.
The second problem that Congress wanted to rectify concerned
the procedure by which a parent company decided whether to
include a possessions corporation subsidiary in its consolidated fed-
eral income tax return under section 1501. 25 If a possessions corpo-
22. See generally I.R.C. § 332 (1976). Under this section, a section 931 corporation
could elect to be liquidated into its parent tax-free.
23. Puerto Rican tax law affords possessions corporations income tax exemptions for
a period of years, the length of which is dependent upon the type and location of the
industry on the Island. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, §§ 255a-255b (1982). Once the
exemption expires, parent companies frequently find that operating a possessions corpo-
ration is no longer advantageous. When this occurred in the pre-section 936 period,
parent corporations liquidated possessions corporations and obtained their earnings tax-
free. I.R.C. § 332 (1976); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 255e (1982).
24. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 254-55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3149, 3149-50; TREAS. DEP'T SECOND ANN. REP., supra note 21, at
21. This report provides extensive background information about the Tax Reform Act of
1976.
25. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 258, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3149, 3153-54; TREAS. DEP'T SECOND ANN. REP., supra note 21, at 21.
I.R.C. § 1501 (1982) provides that "[a]n affiliated group of corporations shall ... have
the privilege of making a consolidated return with respect to the income tax imposed...
for the taxable year in lieu of separate returns." I.R.C. § 1504(a) defines an "affiliated
group" as:
one or more chains of includible corporations connected through stock owner-
ship with a common parent corporation which is an includible corporation if--
(1) Stock possessing at least 80 percent of the voting power of all classes of
stock and at least 80 percent of each class of the nonvoting stock of each
of the includible corporations (except the common parent corporation) is
owned directly by one or more of the other includible corporations; and
(2) The common parent owns directly stock possessing at least 80 percent of
the voting power of all classes of stock and at least 80 percent of each
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ration and any subsidiaries of the parent met the tests prescribed
under section 1504,26 the subsidiaries were includible in the parent's
consolidated return. All corporations includible in the return consti-
tuted an "affiliated group," 27 a taxable entity for federal income tax
purposes.
Prior to 1977, section 1504's definition of "includible corpora-
tion" excluded "[c]orporations entitled to the benefits of section 931,
by reason of receiving a large percentage of their income from
sources within possessions of the United States."'28 This definition,
however, evoked great controversy. The Service argued that section
1504 barred parents from including any possessions corporations in
a consolidated return.29 Parent companies argued that the question
of includibility turned on whether the possessions corporation
derived any benefits under section 931.30 Under this theory, a pos-
sessions corporation derived section 931 benefits when it made a
profit during the taxable year and received no section 931 benefits
when it sustained a loss.31 If a possessions corporation received sec-
tion 931 benefits, the corporation was not includible in the parent
company's consolidated return under section 1504.32 Instead,
according to the parent companies, the possessions corporation had
to file a separate return.33 But if the possessions corporation
received no section 931 benefits, the parent companies reasoned, it
was includible in the parent company's return.34
The Tax Court settled the controversy in favor of the parent
companies.3 5 Section 1504 therefore bestowed substantial benefits
on both parent companies and possessions corporations: in those
years in which the possessions corporations lost money, the parent
could treat them as includible corporations and deduct the losses,
and in those years in which the possessions corporations made a
profit, the parents could treat them as non-includible corporations
and receive the benefit of the section 931 exemption. Congress
class of the nonvoting stock of at least one of the other includible corpo-
rations.
I.R.C. § 1504(a) (1982).
26. See supra note 25.
27. Id
28. I.R.C. § 1504(b)(4) (1970),prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1525, 1643.
29. See Burke Concrete Accessories, Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 588 (1971).
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id
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looked unfavorably upon this practice3 6 and realized the need to
redefine what constituted an "includible" possessions corporation
under section 1504.37
Responding to these problems, Congress passed the Tax
Reform Act of 1976,38 which overhauled the entire possessions cor-
poration system of taxation. Congress amended section 931 to apply
only to individuals and created section 936 to deal specifically with
possessions corporations.39 Under section 936, possessions corpora-
tions must meet the same "80-50" income tests4° that were applicable
under section 931.41 But, unlike its predecessor, section 936 does not
exempt possessions corporations' earnings from United States
income tax.42 Instead, the United States taxes possessions corpora-
tions on their world-wide income.43 Possessions corporations, how-
ever, can claim a credit equal to that portion of their tax liability
attributable to the earnings derived from possessions-source operat-
ing profits and from certain investment income.44 By making this
36. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 258, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3149, 3153-54.
37. Id
38. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525.
39. I.R.C. § 936 (1976).
40. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Of course, when applying the 80-50
gross income tests, &iossessions corporations must ascertain the source of their income.
Because most section 936 corporations derive their income from the sale of products that
they manufacture in Puerto Rico, the most important source rules deal with the sale or
exchange of personal property. Sections 861 through 863 of the Internal Revenue Code
cover this subject. I.R.C. §§ 861-863 (1982). Under these code sections, the source of
income from the sale or exchange of personal property is generally where title passes to
the purchaser. Thus, if a possessions corporation sells the goods that it manufactures in
Puerto Rico to its United States parent corporation and if title to the goods passes in
Puerto Rico, the income earned by the possessions corporation on such sales will be
Puerto Rican source income.
41. I.R.C. § 936(a)(2) (1976).
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 936(a)(1)(1976).
43. I.R.C. § 936(a)(1)(1976). For purposes of this Note, world-wide income is
defined as all income earned by a possessions corporation regardless of where the earn-
ing process took place.
44. Id The section 936 credit, however, does not apply to "gross income actually
received by a possessions corporation within the United States, whether or not that
income is derived from sources within or without the United States." H.R. REP. No. 658,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 258, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3149, 3154.
The concept of possessions source investment income is best understood in light of
H.R. REP. No. 658's explanation of section 936. That report states:
[q]ualified possession source investment income includes only income from
sources within a possession in which the possessions corporation actively con-
ducts a trade or business (whether or not such business produces taxable income
that taxable year). Furthermore, the taxpayer must establish to the satisfaction
of the Secretary that the funds invested were obtained from the active conduct of
a trade or business within that same possession and were actually invested in
assets in that possession. Funds placed with an intermediary (such as a bank
located in the possession) are to be treated as invested in that possession only if it
can be shown that the intermediary did not re-invest the funds outside the pos-
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change, Congress satisfied its desire to tax income earned by posses-
sions corporations outside of a possession, since, under section 936,
such income is not eligible for a tax credit.45
In passing the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress also addressed
the includibility of a possessions corporation's profits and losses in a
parent's consolidated income tax return. It amended section 1504's
definition of includible corporation so as to exclude specifically from
an "affiliated group" any section 936 corporation.46 Moreover, Con-
gress provided that a corporation, to be eligible for the section 936
credit, must elect possessions corporation status.47 The corporation
cannot revoke the election without the consent of the Secretary.48
Thus, possessions corporations cannot make possessions corporation
status for a particular taxable year dependent upon their profits and
losses. As a result, parent companies no longer derive substantial
advantages by electing consolidated reporting in loss years and by
electing to exclude income or to take a credit in profit years.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 made two other significant
changes in the possessions corporation system. First, it amended the
section 246(a) rule that disallowed parent corporations from taking a
dividends received deduction for dividends paid to them by posses-
sions corporations.49 Under the amended provision, the maximum
session. The special treatment for qualified possession source investment income
is provided so that the possessions do not lose a significant source of capital
which they presently have available to them for the financing of government
development programs and private investment.
H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 257, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3149, 3152-53.
45. The section 931 exemption extended to all possessions corporation earnings
except gross income actually received by a possessions corporation within the United
States. As a result, section 931 corporations often invested earnings derived from active
business operations in either possessions or foreign countries rather than in the United
States. In this way, possessions corporations avoided paying United States taxes. Con-
gress viewed this practice as an abuse of the tax system:
However, investing the business earnings of these possession corporations
outside of the possession where the business is being conducted does not contrib-
ute significantly to the economy of that possession either by creating new jobs or
by providing capital to others to build new plants and equipment. Accordingly,
while the committee believes it is appropriate to continue to exempt trade or
business income derived in a possession and investment income earned in that
possession, your committee does not believe it is appropriate to provide a tax
exemption for income from investments outside of the possession.
H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 255, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3149, 3150-51. Section 936 remedies the above problem by allowing possessions
corporations to claim a credit equal to that portion of their tax liability attributable to
possessions source operating profits and investment income.
46. I.R.C. § 1504(b)(4) (1976).
47. Id § 936(a)(1).
48. Id. § 936(e)(2)(A) (After 10 years, consent is not necessary. I.R.C.
§ 936(e)(2)(B)(1976)).
49. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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allowable deduction is one hundred percent.50 This change encour-
ages possessions corporations to repatriate accumulated earnings
that they cannot reinvest profitably in a possession. Moreover, by
allowing a one hundred percent dividends received deduction, Con-
gress eliminated the practice of liquidating possessions corporations
solely to obtain retained earnings tax-free. Second, the Act directed
the Treasury Department to submit to Congress an annual report
analyzing the revenue, investment, and employment effects of sec-
tion 936 on the United States and its possessions.51 These reports
came to play a major role in the passage of the 1982 amendments to
the possessions corporation system.5 2
Despite the broad scope of the 1976 changes, Congress failed to
rectify a number of pressing problems that had plagued the posses-
sions corporation system. The most important of these was the allo-
cation of income derived from intangibles transferred from a parent
company to a possessions corporation. The rules governing such
transfers were unclear and were the source of controversy and litiga-
tion.53 Congress waited six years before resolving this problem.5 4
C. PUERTO Rico's TAx TREATMENT OF POSSESSIONS
CORPORATIONS
To some extent, the success or failure of the possessions corpo-
ration system is dependent upon the tax incentives that the Puerto
Rican Government provides to American corporations.55 If the
Puerto Rican Government decided not to provide incentives, the
advantages United States corporations would derive from operating
in Puerto Rico would be reduced significantly. At present, the
Puerto Rican tax system provides substantial tax inducements to
50. See I.R.C. § 243(a) (1976).
51. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 259, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3149.
52. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
53. At present, the Service is involved in litigating two section 936 cases which deal
with the allocation of income derived from transferred intangibles. Eli Lilly Co. and
Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, No. 76-5113 (T.C. filed June 1976); Searle Co. and Subsidiaries
v. Comm'r, No. 79-12836 (T.C. Filed June 1979).
54. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213,
96 Stat. 324. The Act establishes concrete rules for determining the allocation of income
derived from intangibles transferred from a parent to a possessions corporation. See also
section two of this Note.
55. In 1900, Congress granted Puerto Rico exclusive taxing jurisdiction over the
Puerto Rican source income of its residents. Organic Act of 1900, Pub. L. No. 56-191,
§ 14,31 Stat. 77, 80. See also Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 64-446,39
Stat. 319 (1950). Thus, Puerto Rico taxes Puerto Rican corporations on their world-wide
income and it taxes non-Puerto Rican corporations, such as possessions corporations,
only on the income they earn as a result of operating on the Island.
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possessions corporations.56 If Puerto Rico were to eliminate these
inducements, parent companies would probably be less inclined to
establish operations there, despite the benefits of section 936.
Traditionally, Puerto Rico has employed two taxing devices that
have affected significantly the possessions corporation system. The
first of these devices is the industrial tax exemption.5 7 The exemp-
tion policy is traceable to the Industrial Tax Exemption Act of
1948.58 This Act exempted qualified firms from income, property,
and municipal taxation in the hope that the exemptions would
induce American firms to move to Puerto Rico.5 9 Puerto Rico subse-
quently has passed several different versions of the industrial tax
exemption, all based on this same goal.60 Today's version of the
industrial exemption is the Industrial Incentive Act of 1978.61 This
exemption, like its predecessors, allows possessions corporations to
pay significantly reduced income62 and property63 taxes.
The second taxing device employed by the Puerto Rican Gov-
ernment is the "tollgate" or withholding tax. ,4 This tax works as fol-
lows: when a possessions corporation pays a dividend to its United
States parent, it must remit a specified percentage of the amount of
the dividend to the Puerto Rico Department of the Treasury.65
Under current rules, the tollgate tax must exceed ten percent of the
dividend. 66 The exact rate depends upon how long the possessions
corporation has invested the distributed funds in Puerto Rico and
how long the possessions corporation has invested the funds in cer-
tain forced investments. 67
56. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of Puerto
Rico's tax treatment of possessions corporations, see TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra
note 4, at 23-31.
57. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 255a(c)-255a(d) (1982) (defining those businesses eligi-
ble for the industrial tax exemption).
58. Industrial Tax Exemption Act of 1948, 1948 P.R. Laws, Act No. 184, ch. 35.
59. Id
60. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Industrial Tax Exemption Act of 1954, 1954 P.R. Laws, Act
No. 6, ch. 35; Puerto Rico Industrial Tax Exemption Act of 1963, 1963 P.R. Laws, Act
No. 7, ch. 7.
61. Puerto Rico Industrial Incentive Act of 1978, 1978 P.R. Laws, Act No. 26.
62. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 255b(a)(1982).
63. Id § 266b(h) (delineating tax exemption rules applicable to property used for
industrial development).
64. See id § 255c.
65. Id § 255c(b).
66. Id
67. Id
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II
RECENT CHANGES IN THE POSSESSIONS
CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198268 modi-
fied the possessions corporation system in two ways. First, it estab-
lished rules for the allocation of income derived from intangibles
that have been transferred from a parent to a subsidiary operating in
Puerto Rico.69 Second, the Act imposed more stringent limits upon
the amount of passive investment that possessions corporations can
earn.70 Congress believed that these changes not only would curb
abuses in the possessions corporation system but also would raise
additional tax revenues. 71
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF RULES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF INCOME
DERIVED FROM TRANSFERRED INTANGIBLES
A traditional concern of the Internal Revenue Service has been
the "shifting" of income-producing assets7 2 between related organi-
zations.73 This activity, if unregulated, allows parent corporations to
minimize income taxes by transferring such assets to a subsidiary.
Under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Service can
prevent this type of tax avoidance. 74 That section authorizes the
Internal Revenue Service to "distribute, apportion or allocate" gross
income between or among related corporations, trades, or businesses
"to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of any
of these organizations. 75
Over the years, the transfer of income-producing intangibles
from parent companies to section 936 corporations has given rise to
significant allocation problems.76 These transfers were usually tax-
68. See Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213, 96 Stat. 324, 452.
69. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213, 96
Stat. 324, 452.
70. Id
71. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 504-05, reprintedin 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1281-83; 128 CONG. REC. S8795-8809 (daily ed. July 21,
1982).
72. For purposes of this Note, income-producing assets are any assets that help a
business earn income or that actually produce income. Examples includes stocks, bonds,
factories and intangibles such as patents, formulas and copyrights.
73. See generally TREAS. DEP'T SECOND ANN. REP., supra note 21, at 10-11.
74. See I.R.C. § 482 (1976). Section 482 requires that transactions between related
parties be at arms-length. Treas. Reg. § l.482-l(b)(1) (1983).
75. I.R.C. § 482(1976).
76. See, e.g., Chaotic Negotiations Led to Possessions Credit Changes, 16 TAX NOTES
1094-95 (Sept. 20, 1982); N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1982, at Dl, D8; 128 CONG. REc. 58803-
04 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole); Internal Revenue Service Technical
Advice Memorandum 8040019 (July 7, 1979), 189 IRS LETTER RULINGS, Part II (CCH
Oct. 1980).
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free under section 351. 77 In a typical situation, section 936 corpora-
tions used the intangibles to manufacture products and to market
them directly to mainland wholesalers. They then priced the prod-
ucts to recover both their manufacturing costs and the parent firm's
research and development costs. 78 Theoretically, the procedure
resulted in a two-fold tax benefit: (1) section 936 corporations could
claim a credit equal to the income attributable to the products and
(2) the parent companies could deduct the cost of research and
development from their taxable United States income. The Service,
however, questioned this procedure and attempted to reallocate the
income under section 482.79 This issue is currently before the Tax
Court.80
In 1982, Congress attempted to raise additional revenue by
focusing upon the practice of transferring intangibles, an activity
which was seen by many as an abuse of the tax system.81 The legisla-
tive history of TEFRA emphasizes Congress's concern for the dis-
parity between the average tax expenditure per employee and the
average wage per employee of section 936 corporations.8 2 Congress
77. I.R.C. § 351 (1976). Section 351 permits United States corporations that own
80% or more of a United States subsidiary to transfer appreciated property, including
intangibles, to the subsidiary solely in exchange for the subsidiary's stock or securities
without recognition of gain. The Code treats the transfers as tax free on the premise that
the subsidiary will eventually be taxed on income produced by the transferred property.
See TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 15. This rationale, however, does not
apply when transfers are made to possessions corporations because their income is tax-
exempt. Consequently, the Service challenged this practice. See infra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text.
78. Treasury Proposes Less Stringent Puerto Rico Provisions, 16 TAx NOTES 551
(Aug. 1982); 128 CONG. REC. 58803 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
79. See Internal Revenue Service Technical Advice Memorandum 8040019 (July 7,
1979), 189 IRS LETTER RnIJNGS, Part II (CCH Oct. 1980).
In the memorandum, a parent corporation made a section 351 transfer of intangibles
to its possessions corporation subsidiary. The Service took the position that the transfer
lacked substance and that tax avoidance motivated the parent. As a result, it refused to
treat the tangible as "belonging" to the possession. Instead, it applied section 482 and
reallocated all the income produced by the intangibles to the parent. This action reduced
the amount of income possessions corporations could shield from United States tax. See
TREAS. DEPT. FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 19.
80. Although the new rules clarify the allocation procedure, they do not resolve out-
standing allocation disputes between the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers. As a
result, a number of suits dealing with this issue are in litigation. See supra note 53.
81. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 505, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781, 1282-83; 128 CONG. REC. S8803-04 (daily ed. July 21,
1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
82. 128 CONG. REc. S8803-04 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole). The
term "tax expenditures" refers to "the taxes an entity would pay under a hypothetical full
tax regime if its profits were the same as under some exempt regime." Puerto Rico
Treasury Department-Position Paper on Effects of Legislative Amendments to Section
936 of the Internal Revenue Code Approved by the Senate Finance Committee [herein-
after cited as Position Paper], reprinted in 128 CONG. REc. S8795-8800 (daily ed. July 21,
1982).
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focused on the pharmaceutical industry, which had derived windfall
tax benefits from the transfer of intangibles.8 3 In 1978, for example,
the average tax expenditure per employee in that industry exceeded
$43,000, while the average wage per employee was only about
$13,000.84 Congress questioned the efficacy of such a system, given
that the drug industry accounted for approximately fifty percent of
the tax expenditures under section 93685 but provided in return only
fifteen percent of Puerto Rico's manufacturing jobs and only about
three percent of Puerto Rico's total jobs.8 6 Senator Robert Dole,
Senate Finance Committee Chairman, commented on these
statistics:
The Government loses over $500 million to provide only 3 percent of
Puerto Rico's employment. This is not a good bargain for us or even a
worthwhile deal for Puerto Rico, although it is a tremendous deal for the
drug industry. Moreover, according to the Treasury Department, intangible-
intensive industries, like the drug industry, do very little to encourage the
development of related industries in Puerto Rico, because their customers
and suppliers are not in Puerto Rico.
87
There was thus a strong need for Congress to make clear rules
governing the transfer of intangibles to possessions corporations.
The Senate originally urged that all income from transferred
intangibles be allocated to United States shareholders. 8 The Puerto
Rican Government, however, bitterly opposed this drastic meas-
ure.89 Congress eventually adopted a compromise position.
For a discussion of the "tax expenditure per employee" concept, see infra note 145 and
accompanying text.
83. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT on THE OPERATION AND
EFFECT OF THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION 36-48 (1980) [herein-
after cited as TREAs. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REP.].
84. Id at 48. In contrast, in 1978 the average tax expenditure per employee of all
section 936 manufacturing corporations was $12,667, while the average compensation per
employee was $10,697. Id The 1978 averages are important because they are the ones
Congress used when examining the possessions corporation system and when promulgat-
ing TEFRA.
In February 1983, six months after TEFRA's passage, the Treasury Department
released its fourth annual report. That report shows that the tax benefits section 936
corporations received as a result of operating in Puerto Rico increased substantially
between 1978 and 1980. In 1980, the average tax expenditure per employee in the phar-
maceutical industry was $58,743 while the average compensation per employee was
$15,644. TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 112. The average 1980 tax expen-
diture per employee of all section 936 manufacturing corporations was $17,186, while
average compensation per employee was $11,915. Id.
85. Id
86. Id See also 128 CONG. REc. 58803 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
87. 128 CONG. REc. S8803 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
88. For the original Senate version of the section 936 amendments, see 128 CONG.
REc. S8604 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
89. See, e.g., supra note 82; Letter from Carlos Romero-Barcel6, Governor of Puerto
Rico, to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan concerning the proposed amendments to section
936, reprinted in 128 CONG. REc. S8802 (daily ed. July 21, 1982).
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The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 provided
two options which allow corporations to treat income attributable to
manufacturing intangibles9" as income eligible for the section 936
credit. Under the first option, parent corporations can transfer these
types of intangibles to a section 936 subsidiary provided the subsidi-
ary (1) shares, through a cost-sharing payment, in the annual
research and development costs of the parent and other affiliates9'
90. For purposes of the rule changes, the term "manufacturing intangible" includes
patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns and know how. The term,
however, does not include marketing intangibles such as trademarks, trade names and
brand names. Moreover, the manufacting intangibles covered by the cost sharing option
"must be related to the products produced or services rendered" by the possessions cor-
poration. H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 506, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1283-84.
91. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i) (1982). The conference report accompanying the new
rules states that:
[tihe cost sharing payment will be equal in amount to a fraction of the current
year's worldwide direct and indirect product area research expenditures. The
fraction would generally equal the ratio of third party sales of products produced
or services rendered, in whole or in part, in the possession to third party sales of
all products produced or services rendered by the [section 936 corporation] and
its affiliates (U.S. and foreign) in the same product area.
H.R. Rep. No. 760, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 506, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 781, 1283-84. A product area is a group of related products as defined by "refer-
ence to the three-digit classification of the Standard Industrial Classification Code."
I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(I)(e) (1982). The United States government developed the Stan-
dard Industrial Classification Code in order to classify more efficiently industry activities
and to facilitate the collection, analysis and presentation of industry data. The Code
classifies various industries and products through a two-digit, three-digit and four-digit
classification system. It assigns each major industry a two-digit classification number.
The Code then divides each major industry into product groups classified by a three-digit
number. Each three-digit classification is further broken down into even more specific
product groups which are given four-digit classification numbers. U.S. OFFICE OF MAN-
AGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL 9-13, 116-17
(1972). Under this system, for example, the Code assigns to all industries producing
chemicals and allied products the same two-digit numbers. "Drugs" is one three-digit
classification group within the chemicals and allied products industry. The drugs group
consists of biological products, medicinal chemicals, botanical products and pharmaceu-
tical preparations. The Code assigns each of these products a specific four-digit number.
Id at 116-17.
After determining the relevant three-digit product area, possessions corporations can
reduce their cost sharing payments to the following formula:
Total product area sales by
possessions corporations to
Total product third parties
area research x
expenditures Total product area sales by
possessions corporations and
United States and foreign
affiliates to third parties
I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(I) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 506-07,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1283-84. See I.R.C.§ 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(I)(a) (1982) (defining product area research); I.R.C.
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and (2) has a "significant business presence" in Puerto Rico.92 If a
section 936 corporation satisfies these conditions, it can claim the full
income derived from the manufacturing intangibles and the full tax
credit.93 But when a possessions corporation manufactures a prod-
uct and uses a transferred intangible in the production process, it
must follow pricing guidelines established in section 482 regulations
if it sells the product to an affiliate.94 Cost sharing payments
received by a parent company from a possessions corporation are
not includible in the parent's gross income.95 Instead, they reduce
the parent's deductions for research and development. 96
Under the second option, a parent corporation and its posses-
sions corporation subsidiary can split equally their combined taxable
income resulting from partial or complete production of products in
Puerto Rico.97 Fifty percent of this income is allocable to the posses-
sions corporation and fifty percent is allocable to the parent com-
pany.98 To qualify for profit sharing, a possessions corporation must
§ 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(I)(c) (1982) (defining possessions sales); I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(I)(d)
(1982) (defining total sales).
92. To qualify "to elect cost sharing for a product or type of service, [a possessions
corporation] must have and maintain a significant business presence in the possession
with respect to that product or type of service.... [These requirements are met] if
(1) more than 25 percent of the value added by the [parent company, possessions corpo-
ration and other affiliates] to the product is added by the [possessions corporation] in a
possession or (2) at least 65 percent of the direct labor costs of the [parent company,
possessions corporation and other affiliates] for the product or service (or in connection
with the purchase and sale of goods not produced by the affiliated group) are incurred by
the island affiliate and are compensation for services rendered in the possession....
[The] test is intended to require real and significant business activity in the possessions."
H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 507, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 781, 1284-85; I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(B)(ii) (1982).
93. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(II) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
508-09, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS 781, 1285-87.
94. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(V)(b) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 509-10, reprntedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1286-88.
95. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(IV)(a) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
508, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1285-86.
96. LR.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(i)(IV)(a) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 508, reprntedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1285-86.
97. LR.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(ii) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 510-11,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1287-89.
98. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (1982). H.R. REP. No. 760 contains a concise expla-
nation of the effect and mechanics of electing the 50/50 profit split option:
If an election is made, the island affiliate will be entitled to 50 percent of the
combined taxable income from the sale of products produced or services ren-
dered in a possession by the island affiliate and sold to third parties or foreign
affiliates by the island affiliate or a mainland affiliate. The remainder of the
combined taxable income for a product will be allocated to the mainland affili-
ates. This latter amount may exceed the island affiliate's share of the income
from the product if the amount of proportionate product area research expendi-
tures, determined under cost sharing, is in excess of the amount allocable to the
combined taxable income absent application of the cost-sharing formula. For
example, if combined taxable income is $100 without taking into account
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satisfy the same significant business presence test required under the
cost-sharing option.99 Moreover, it must manufacture or produce
the product in the possession within the meaning of section 954,100
the controlled foreign corporation provision.' 0' To elect the option, a
possessions corporation must satisfy one additional requirement: it
must make its election by the due date of its first post-1982 tax
return. 0 2 If the products or services within the product area covered
by the election do not meet the significant business presence test, the
possessions corporation may not claim a section 936 credit for
income attributable to these products or services.
Congress hoped that these options would eliminate many of the
abuses it perceived to be assoicated with the possessions corporation
system of taxation, and that they would raise additional tax revenue.
It hoped that the new rules would not, however, dissuade corpora-
tions from establishing operations in Puerto Rico. Controversy
exists as to whether the new rules will serve these goals.
B. INCREASING THE ACTIVE TRADE OR BUSINESS REQUIREMENT
Before the 1982 changes, possessions corporations could earn up
to fifty percent of their total income from passive investments such as
bank deposits, stocks, and bonds.'0 3 This led Section 936 corpora-
tions to accumulate liquid investments.' 4 Moreover, the large
amount of money held in Puerto Rican banks did not always pro-
vide new capital for Puerto Rican businesses. 0 5 On many occasions,
the banks invested these funds overseas. 10 6
research and development expenses allocable or apportionable thereto, the
amount of such expenses are $10, and the amount computed under cost-sharing
(without offsets for island affiliate expenses) is $12, the island affiliate's share of
combined taxable income ($100 less $12) is $44 (one-half of $88), and the main-
land affiliate's share of combined taxable income is $46 ($100 less $10 of alloca-
ble and apportionable expenses and less the island affiliate's $44 share). Thus,
the use of this formula is not intended to allow a deduction to any mainland
affiliate which would not otherwise be allowable.
H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 511, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 781, 1288-89. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(C)(ii)(II) (1982).
99. I.R.C. §§ 936(h)(5)(A)-936(h)(5)(B) (1982). H.R. RP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 510,reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1287-88. See supra note
92.
100. I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(A) (1982).
101. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(F)(iv)(II) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 510,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781, 1287-88.
102. I.R.C. § 936(h)(5)(F)(i) (1982). This requirement also applies to the cost-sharing
option.
103. I.R.C. § 936(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981),prior to amendment by Tax Equity and Fis-
cal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213, 96 Stat. 324, 452.
104. Position Paper, supra note 82, at 58803.
105. Id.
106. Id at S8803-04.
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Congress questioned the extent to which these practices actually
furthered Puerto Rican economic development. 0 7 To cope with
these perceived abuses, Congress raised, from fifty to sixty-five, the
percentage of a corporation's gross income that must be derived
from an active trade or business. 0 8 Congress hoped to increase
thereby the capital investments of businesses in Puerto Rico. 0 9
III
SECTION 936's RELATIONSHIP TO PUERTO
RICO'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of section 936 is to enhance both employment and
industrial opportunities in Puerto Rico." 0 The position of the
Treasury Department of Puerto Rico reflects this view:
Section 936 has played an extremely important part in the Puerto Rico
industrial development program. Puerto Rico has advanced since 1940 from
a poverty-stricken island heavily dependent on low-wage sugar production to
a modem, semi-industrialized economy. Much of the credit for this success-
ful record goes to the Island's program to attract mainland private industry
to Puerto Rico through Puerto Rico's Industrial Incentive Acts, which build
upon Federal tax benefits provided to qualifying U.S. corporations locating
in Puerto Rico. These Federal tax benefits, provided under section 936 of the
Internal Revenue Code, have been essential to the rapid growth in United
States private investment which has been the backbone of the Island's
development. I I 
To evaluate the possessions corporation system, one must review
trends in employment, education, and industry in Puerto Rico over
the last decade.
Important indicators of the success of section 936 are the
number and quality of jobs in Puerto Rico. Today, Puerto Rico
needs more jobs, 12 including "primary" jobs.' '3 There are several
reasons for this employment problem. First, Puerto Rico no longer
107. 128 CONG. REC. S8795-8809 (daily ed. July 21, 1982).
108. I.R.C. §§ 936(a)(2)(B)-936(a)(2)(C) (1982). The 65% requirement will be phased
in over three taxable years. In the 1983 taxable year, the required percentage was 55, and
in 1984 it is 60. In the 1985 taxable year, the required percentage will finally reach 65.
109. 128 CONG. Rnc. S8795-8809 (daily ed. July 21, 1982).
110. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1525, 1643.
111. Position Paper, supra note 82, at S8797.
112. The unemployment rate during the summer of 1982 reached 23.6%. Id at 58796.
113. Michael Piore, a labor economist, describes "primary" jobs in Puerto Rico as
follows:
[Tihe primary market offers jobs which possess the following traits: high
wages, good working conditions, employment stability and job security, equity
and due process in the administration of work rules, and chances for advance-
ment. The secondary sector has jobs that are decidedly less attractive, compared
with those in the primary sector. They tend to involve low wages, poor working
conditions, considerable variability in employment, harsh and often arbitrary
discipline, and little opportunity to advance. The poor are confined to the secon-
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serves industry as a source of low cost labor. 114 As a result of
increased wage demands by labor in recent years, many traditional,
labor-intensive industries have left the Island and have moved to
developing countries where labor is cheaper.1 5 Second, the expecta-
tions of Puerto Ricans have risen as their Island has undergone eco-
nomic development: residents want jobs that are better than those
that were held by preceding generations. 116 The growing demand
for "primary" jobs is a by-product of the increasing educational level
of the labor force.' 17 School enrollment has increased significantly
since 1950.118 In that year, 49.3 percent of the school age population
(6 to 18 years) attended some educational institution. 119 By 1977,
this figure had increased to 79 percent. 120 Moreover, the amount of
public funds expended on education has increased substantially, 121
resulting in a dramatically improved quality of education. 22 These
qualitative improvements are affecting the composition of the work
force. Not only is the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers increasing
over time, but the Puerto Rican technicians and managers are dis-
placing their American counterparts. 23 Finally, the availability of
dary labor market. Eliminating poverty requires that they gain access to primary
employment.
Research Paper One, STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF SOPHISTICATED MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PUERTO Rico 6 (Arthur D. Little, Inc.
1980) [hereinafter cited as Research Paper One], citing Piore, "Jobs and Training," in THE
STATE AND THE POOR 55 (S. Beer & R. Barrington eds. 1970).
114. In the Puerto Rican apparel industry, for example, real wages (wages adjusted for
price inflation) increased 260% between 1955 and 1980. TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP.,
supra note 4, at 43. Two specific factors account for the increase. First, because of the
growth in investment and the increase in education and on-the-job training in the 1950s
and 1960s, Puerto Rican labor has become more productive. Id Second, and more
important, between 1940 and 1981 the United States phased in its minimum wage laws in
Puerto Rico. Id The hourly wage rate in many Puerto Rican industries, such as
apparel, food products, and leather products, was near or at the legal minimum. Id at
45-46. The Treasury Department suggested that "[t]his clustering of workers at or near
the minimum, combined with the fact that the minimum wage increased more than aver-
age actual wages in many Puerto Rican industries between 1973 and 1977, indicates that
changes in the minimum wage in Puerto Rico have tended to increase Puerto Rican
wages." Id at 47.
115. TREAs. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REp., supra note 83, at 28-30. These countries include
Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines. Research
Paper One, supra note 113, at 13.
116. Research Paper One, supra note 113, at 5.
117. Id at 1, 5, 26-28.
118. Puerto Rico Planning Board, 2 Informe Recursos Humanos 488 (1974), citedin
C. SANTIAGO, LABOR AND DEVELOPMENT IN PUERTO Rico 17 (Jan. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as C. SANTIAGO].
119. Id
120. Id
121. C. SANTIAGO, supra note 118, at 18. In 1954-55, for example, Puerto Rico
expended $75.40 per student. By 1972-73, this figure had increased to $450.00 per
student.
122. Id
123. Id
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food stamps and other transfer payments eliminates an unemployed
worker's need to take any job. 2 4 Instead, a worker can wait until
the job he wants becomes available.125 These three factors indicate
that the quality as well as the quantity of jobs must be considered in
attempting to solve Puerto Rico's employment problem.
Section 936 has increased the number and improved the quality
of jobs in Puerto Rico. A brief review of Puerto Rico's recent indus-
trial and employment history illustrates that fact. In recent years,
traditional, labor-intensive industries, such as textile, apparel,
leather, and tobacco industries, have either reduced or ceased their
operations in Puerto Rico and established facilities in developing
countries where wages are lower.126 As a result, thousands of Puerto
Rican workers have lost jobs. In contrast, technology-oriented
industries have moved to Puerto Rico and have created many
jobs.'2 7 At present, these industries provide 39.4 percent of Puerto
Rico's manufacturing jobs and serve as one of its most important
sources of new employment. 28  High technology industries
expanded employment by thirty-seven percent between 1976 and
1981.129 During that period, employment in the electronics industry
124. See generally TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 48 (listing the
amounts of federal grants-in-aid and taxes transferred to Puerto Rico by the United
States Government for selected years during the 1968-1981 period).
125. Research Paper One, supra note 113, at 5. See also TREAs. DEP'T THIRD ANN.
REP., supra note 83, at 28.
Besides reducing the incentive of an unemployed Puerto Rican to accept anything less
than the "right" job, the expansion of federal income maintenance programs in Puerto
Rico has created other problems. Specifically, the programs may have increased the real
cost of labor in Puerto Rico. On this subject, the Treasury Department has stated that
the "programs may reduce work incentives and, by inducing higher labor turnover rates,
raise labor-training costs." TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 47.
126. Between 1968 and 1978, the number of industries engaged in manufacturing
tobacco products, textile products, apparel products, and leather products decreased 31%,
42%, 87%, and 36%, respectively. Research Paper One, supra note 113, at 10 (citing COM-
MONWEALTH OF PUERTO Rico, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CEN-
SUS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO Rico (1968-1978)). Moreover, in
1975, The Tobin Committee stated that "[t]he shifting structure of industry reflects partly
the shifting real comparative advantage of Puerto Rico. As the Puerto Rican labor force
has become better trained and more productive, it has become too valuable a resource to
use in these [labor-intensive] industries." The Committee to Study Puerto Rico's
Finances, Report to the Governor 21 (1975).
127. In the ten years between 1968 and 1978, for example, the number of establish-
ments engaged in manufacturing chemicals and allied products, drugs, electrical machin-
ery and professional and scientific instruments increased 65%, 42%, 31%, and 57%,
respectively. Moreover, in that same period employment increased 255%, 579%, 77%,
and 228%, respectively. Research Paper One, supra note 113, at 10-11 (citing COMMON-
WEALTH OF PUERTO Rico, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CENSUS
OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO Rico (1968-1978)). See also TREAS.
DEPT. FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 53 (listing the distribution of employment in Puerto
Rican manufacturing industries between 1968 and 1981).
128. Position Paper, supra note 82, at S8797.
129. Id
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increased by fifty-six percent, to 20,800 employees. 30 During the
decade from 1968 to 1978, jobs created in high technology industries
have offset about one-half the jobs lost through diminution of tradi-
tional industrial activity on the Island.' 3' The establishment and
expansion of these industries is in large part due to the benefits con-
ferred by section 936.132
Despite the significant contributions that high technology indus-
tries make to the Puerto Rican economy, the industries do not create
enough employment to replace jobs lost in traditional industry and
to provide the new jobs necessary to meet an expanding labor
force. 33 Therefore, unemployment in Puerto Rico remains high. 34
One possible solution to this problem is to attract labor-inten-
sive industries back to Puerto Rico. This approach, however, is not
feasible for two reasons. First, most Puerto Ricans simply do not
130. Id
131. Research Paper One, supra note 113, at 9-12, (citing COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO
Rico, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CENSUS OF MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO RICO (1968-1978)). The pharmaceutical industry, for example,
created approximately 8,335 additional jobs from 1968 to 1978. Id
132. Many major United States manufacturers operating in Puerto Rico have reported
significant tax savings under section 936. See TREAS. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REP., supra
note 83, at 37. But for the existence of these tax savings, no significant reasons exist why
United States manufactures should continue to move to and expand their operations in
Puerto Rico. The position of the Puerto Rico Treasury Department reflects this view:
In creating jobs, Section 936 has been an important tool. While motivations
for investment are as varied and complex in Puerto Rico as they are on the main-
land, most informed observers of the Island's economic scene believe that tax
exemption is an extremely important reason for industrial investment in Puerto
Rico. The Island has few natural resources which can be profitably exploited by
industry. Most firms which have located on the Island ship their final products
to, and obtain their raw materials from, points on the mainland which are
between 900 and 1400 miles from the point of manufacture. 'Energy cost - espe-
cially for electricity - are also somewhat higher than on the mainland, due to the
almost exclusive reliance of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority on oil-
fueled power generation. It will be several years before alternative energy
sources will begin to change these unfavorable energy costs.
For these reasons, and because of the uncertainty that Puerto Rico's present
political status poses, investors considering locating in Puerto Rico generally
look for a post-tax rate of return higher than on the mainland before coming to
the Island, something which Section 936 has been able to provide.
Position Paper, supra note 82, at S8797.
133. Research Paper One, supra note 113, at 12.
134. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The Treasury Department Fourth
Annual Report lists by year the Puerto Rican unemployment rate, total employment in
Puerto Rico, and the distribution of employment in selected sectors of the Puerto Rican
economy:
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want to work in traditional manufacturing industries.135 As the level
of education continues to increase, even fewer Puerto Ricans will be
interested in these jobs.136 Second, to attract traditional industries
back to Puerto Rico would be a difficult task. Tax considerations
play little, if any, role in the decision of these industries to leave
Puerto Rico. Many traditional industries leave Puerto Rico despite
the tax advantages that accompany possessions corporations sta-
tus.137 The major impetus behind the exodus of labor-intensive
Unemploy- Total Total Non- Wholesale Finance,
Year ment Employ- Govern- Government Agricul- Manufac- and Retail Insurance,
Rate ment ment Employment ture turing Trade Real Estate
1950 12.9% 596
1955 14.3 539
1960 13.1 543
1965 11.7 617
1970 10.7 686
1971 11.6 700
1972 11.9 737
1973 11.6 757
1974 13.2 775
1975 18.1 738
1976 19.5 718
1977 19.9 739
1978 18.1 780
1979 17.0 807
1980 17.1 827
1981 19.9 833
Annual growth rate
1950-1960 -1.0%
Annual growth rate
1960-1970 2.4
Annual growth rate
1970-1981 1.8
-1.3% -5.3% 3.9% 0.8% 7.2%
5.5 1.9 -5.8
6.1 0.8 -4.5
5.0 2.8 8.0
1.5 1.8 6.1
TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 37. As the table indicates, Puerto Rico's
unemployment rate has traditionally been high. Moreover, the table also reflects that the
rate of employment growth in recent years in the manufacturing sector has been small
and in fact declined in 1980 and 1981.
135. See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
137. The following table shows the substantial decline in the number of possessions
corporations engaged in traditional manufacturing activities between 1973 and 1980.
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industry from Puerto Rico is wage costs.' 38 The high wages
demanded by Puerto Rican workers make many products produced
by traditional industry noncompetitive in both United States and
international markets. 139 Products manufactured in developing
countries, on the other hand, can be produced for substantially less
cost because wages are lower. As a result, these products have a
competitive advantage in international markets.
The future of Puerto Rico's industrial economy must be based
on capital-intensive, high technology industry. Expansion of tradi-
tional industry is no longer a viable way to bolster the economy.
Therefore, any attenuation of the incentives to attract high technol-
ogy industries to, and to keep such industries in, Puerto Rico would
lead to a decline in industrial growth and a loss of many jobs.
IV
THE EFFICACY OF THE RECENT CHANGES IN
THE POSSESSIONS CORPORATION
SYSTEM
Reviewing the section 936 amendments in light of their effect on
Puerto Rico's economic development and their ability to curtail per-
ceived abuses and to raise revenue makes it clear that Congress
should not have modified the possessions corporation system of taxa-
tion. The TEFRA changes are harmful to the economic develop-
ment of Puerto Rico, the perceived abuses are not pervasive, and the
potential revenue gain is speculative and relatively insignificant.
Number of Number of Percent
Possessions Cor- Possessions Cor- Decrease
Manufacturing Industries porations 1973* porations 1980** (Increase)
Food and Kindred Products 22 18 18.2
Stone, Clay and Glass Products 8 6 25.0
Textile Mill Products 16 9 43.8
Apparel 93 82 11.8
Rubber Products 14 8 42.9
Leather and Leather Products 19 13 31.6
* TREASURY DEPT. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE
POSSESSIONS CORPORATION SYSTEM OF TAXATION 86 (1978).
** TREAS. DEP'T. FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 48-49.
138. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
139. Position Paper, supra note 82.
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A. NEW RULES GOVERNING THE TRANSFER OF INTANGIBLES: A
HARMFUL APPROACH TO A PERCEIVED THREAT
By establishing concrete rules regarding income derived from
transferred intangibles, TEFRA resolved the controversy between
the Internal Revenue Service and Section 936 corporations. 140 As a
result, possessions corporations can better predict the tax conse-
quences of operating in Puerto Rico. The overall efficacy of the
rules, however, remains doubtful.
L PerceivedAbuses of Section 936 as They Relate to Tax
Expenditures
Tax expenditure per employee was an important indicator used
by Congress to assess the possessions corporation system.141 Indus-
tries that rely heavily on intangible transfers generally have a very
high tax expenditure per employee ratio.142 In its examination of the
intangible transfer problem, Congress adopted the view that high tax
expenditures per employee ratios constitute an abuse of the tax sys-
tem. 143 Congress wanted to reduce these ratios through the passage
of TEFRA.'" By dramatically reducing the tax expenditures arising
from intangible-intensive industries, however, Congress hurt Puerto
Rico's economy.
A high tax expenditure per employee ratio indicates that a par-
ticular industry is profitable; a low tax expenditure ratio indicates
the converse. 45 Highly profitable growth industries that necessarily
create large section 936 tax expenditures, such as those involved in
140. See Internal Revenue Service Technical Advice Memorandum 8040019 (July 7,
1979), 189 IRS LETrER RULINGS, Part II (CCH Oct. 1980). See also Eli Lilly Co. and
Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, No. 76-5113 (T.C. filed June 1976); Searle Co. and Subsidiaries
v. Comm'r, No. 79-12836 (T.C. filed June 1979). These cases deal with income allocation
questions in situations where a parent company transferred income-producing
intangibles to a possessions corporation.
141. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
142. TREAs. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REP., supra n4ote 83, at 48-49.
143. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
144. Id
145. Tax expenditure per employee simply equals the total tax expenditure attributa-
ble to a given company divided by the total number of workers the company employs.
The greater the income of a possessions corporation the more money the United States
Treasury loses in the form of section 936 credits. See TREAs. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REP.,
supra note 83, at 48. These credits represent tax expenditures. Thus, the tax expenditure
per employee ratio is a function of profitability. If, for example, possessions corporation
A has five employees, a fifty percent tax rate and a net income of one thousand dollars,
the tax expenditure attributable to A equals five hundred dollars ($1000 X .5) and the tax
expenditure per employee equals one hundred dollars ($500 + 5). If possessions corpora-
tion B has the same tax rate and the same number of employees as A but has a profit of
only five hundred dollars, the tax expenditure attributable to B equals two hundred fifty
dollars ($500 x .5) and the tax expenditure per employee equals fifty dollars ($250 + 5).
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high technology, 146 are the type of industries that should be
encouraged to move to Puerto Rico .147 The Island's continued eco-
nomic development depends upon these enterprises. They are the
industries that have moved to Puerto Rico in the greatest numbers
over recent years, 48 have created the most employment, 49 and have
payed the highest wages.150 But section 936 modifications, by cur-
tailing the tax benefits, make Puerto Rico less attractive to these
industries. The income allocation rules, for example, have reduced
the profitability of high technology industries operating there
because significant amounts of income are no longer shielded from
United States income tax.151 In addition, the diminution of section
936 benefits creates a problem in connection with the attraction of
new possessions corporations to Puerto Rico. Those benefits that
remain may not constitute a significant enough inducement for new
employment-generating investment in Puerto Rico.' 52
The net effect of these factors is that the new rules threaten the
Island's economic development and thus are not in Puerto Rico's
146. The high technology industries are the most profitable manufacturing industries
in Puerto Rico. In 1981, for example, the chemical industry produced 37.3% of Puerto
Rico's total net manufacturing income while the machinery and metal products industry,
the producer of electrical and electronic equipment, earned 28.3% of this total. TREAs.
DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 51. In contrast, the more traditional apparel indus-
try contributed only 8% of Pu6rto Rico's total 1981 net manufacturing income. Id
147. See supra notes 112-32 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
149. Id
150. For example, in 1978, the average hourly wage paid in the drug industry was
$4.32. In contrast, the average hourly wages paid in the tobacco, textile and apparel
industries were all under $3.00. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RiCO, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CENSUS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO
Rico (1978). See generally TREAS. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REP., supra note 83, at 48.
151. The conference report accompanying TEFRA projected that as a result of the
new rules, possessions corporations will pay United States income taxes of $201 million,
$428 million, $473 million, $516 million and $559 million in 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and
1987, respectively. H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 692, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781, 1455.
152. The Treasury Department has recognized that allocating income from trans-
ferred intangibles to possessions corporations induces investment in Puerto Rico. It has
stated that "[i]f the income attributable to the intangibles is treated as earned by the 936
corporation, rather than the parent, the effect of the transfer will be to increase the pool
of tax exempt Puerto Rican income earned by the 936 corporation and thus augment the
incentive for investing in Puerto Rico." TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 5.
Evidence exists that Technical Advice Memorandum 8040019 and the current litiga-
tion concerning the application of section 482 to intangible income may have discour-
aged United States investment in Puerto Rico. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text. After fiscal year 1980, substantially fewer investors made contractual agreements
with the Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration. Specifically, in fiscal
year 1981, investors entered into 20.9% fewer contracts than in fiscal 1980, while in 1982,
investors entered into 15.3% fewer contracts than in fiscal 1980. TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH
REP., supra note 4, at 20. One probable reason for this decline was the uncertain tax
consequences accompanying intangible transfers and the possibility of not being able to
shield large amounts of possessions corporation income from United States taxation.
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best interests.15 3 This threat is very untimely given Puerto Rico's
exorbitant unemployment rate 54 and the declining rate of real
investment on the Island. 155
By passing legislation which reduced the tax benefits afforded
intangible-intensive possessions corporations, Congress implicitly
embraced the misguided view that all such enterprises had abused
the tax system. Admittedly, some high technology industries reaped
153. Congress adopted the TEFRA rule changes despite the Treasury Department
view that Puerto Rico probably derives significant benefits from intangible transfers. On
this subject, it stated:
If a U.S. parent wants to move the production of a patented product to Puerto
Rico, it can license the 936 corporation to produce the product, in whole or in
part, without also giving it title to the intangible. The production license adds to
the productivity of Puerto Rican workers because it gives them an opportunity to
participate in the production of advanced products. The license enables the mar-
ginal product of labor and capital used in Puerto Rico to be as high as that of
labor and capital used in the United States.
Transferring the ownership title to an intangible may also benefit Puerto Rico.
Provided the transfer is accompanied by additional investment of physical assets
in Puerto Rico, it will increase Puerto Rican productivity and growth. If the
income attributable to the intangible is treated as earned by the 936 corporation,
rather than the U.S. parent, the pool of tax-exempt Puerto Rican earnings will
increase. A corporation contemplating an investment decision may find that the
benefits of a tax-free return on intangibles provide sufficient incentive to make a
real physical investment in Puerto Rico. The precise impact of the transfer of
intangibles on Puerto Rican productivity and growth will be closely related to
the volume of physical investment that accompanies the transfer of intangibles.
Manufacturing processes differ in the extent to which the various stages are inte-
grated. In some cases, it may be difficult to separate phases of the production
process, and the U.S. parent corporation will have a strong incentive to move a
substantial operation to Puerto Rico in order to attempt to obtain the benefits of
a tax-free return on its intangibles. In other cases, it may be possible to move a
relatively small part of the whole production process to Puerto Rico.
The tax benefits that U.S. parent corporations have claimed through the trans-
fer of U.S. intangibles to Puerto Rico may eventually have another favorable,
but indirect, effect on Puerto Rico. The increased after-tax returns in high-tech-
nology industries may stimulate additional R&D to develop new products. After
the products are developed, their production may, at least in part, be located in
Puerto Rico.
TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 67-68. (While this statement appears in the
Treasury Department Fourth Annual Report published in February 1983, it is unlikely
that the Treasury Department's view of the effect of intangible transfers on Puerto Rico's
economy changed significantly between the August 1982 passage of TEFRA and the
publication date.)
154. See supra notes 112 & 134 and accompanying text.
155. Over the last decade, the amount of real investment in Puerto Rico has declined
significantly. For a chart summarizing real investment in Puerto Rico for the last 20
years, see TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 41. The TEFRA rule changes
occurred when private, non-residential, fixed investment in Puerto Rico was far below
the peak year of 1973. Because TEFRA takes away existing benefits, it should not only
dissuade United States parent corporations from forming section 936 corporations or
expanding their already existing Puerto Rican operations, but also reduce even further
the annual level of real investment in Puerto Rico. Without an adequate growth in capi-
tal expenditures, Puerto Rico will not prosper.
1983] TAXING POSSESSIONS CORPOR4 TIONS
huge profits at the expense of United States taxpayers through the
transfer of intangibles. 156 The TEFRA amendments, however,
penalize all possessions corporations, the majority of which did not
enjoy such high profits.15 7 For those parent corporations that did not
156. The pharmaceutical industry illustrates this point. In 1978, for example, the
industry paid an average salary of $13,000 per employee while the tax savings per
employee equaled approximately $43,000. The average tax expenditure per employee
among all possessions corporations, on the other hand, equaled $12,667 and the average
employee compensation among all possession corporations equaled $10,697. These
figures indicate that the pharmaceutical industry, among others, made profits from sec-
tion 936 status that were far in excess of the norm. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text. See also TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 112 (listing net income, tax
expenditure, and tax expenditure per employee figures for all industries operating in
Puerto Rico as possessions corporations); infra note 157.
157. The Treasury Department Fourth Annual Report contains a list of average
employee compensation, tax expenditures, and tax expenditures per employee for 1980:
Qualified
Number of Possession
Corporations Net Income
(S00)
Tax Benefits Tax Benefits
Amrount ercent of per Employee
(S00) Total (S)
All Manufacturing Industries
Food and kindred products
Textile mill products
Apparel
Men's and boys'
Women's and children's
Hats, caps, etc.
All other
Chemicals
Industrial chemicals.
plastics
Pharmaceuticals
Soaps, cleaners, etc.
All other
Rubber and plastics
Leather
Footwear
All other
Stone, clay, and glass
Fabricated metal products
Metal cans and containers
Cutlery, hand tools,
screws, bolts
All other
Machinery, except electrical
Electrical and electronic
equipment
Radio, TV, communication
Electronic components
All other
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related
products
Scientific instruments
All other
All other manufacturing
* Less than 0.5%.
2,234,383 961,693
85,983 33,174
5,594 2,687
70.906 32,809
29,233 13,346
37,635 17,707
2,212 939
1,828 817
1,234,178 523,260
105,705 44,471
1,092,059 462,664
31,300 13,828
5,114 2297
15,376 6,830
10.957 4,777
8,189 3,674
2,408 1,103
1,580 621
27,033 12,584
6,040 2.800
9,270 4,236
11,723 5,548
29,998 13,207
411,569
58,245
69,438
283,886
13,568
77,246
6,109
71,137
250,755
185,959
26,112
31,086
128,761
6.116
33,376
3,153
30,223
106,293
17,186
6,194
5,299
2,887
3,377
2,752
2,138
1,521
50,571
23,870
58,743
33,481
11,779
12,935
1,980
1,705
4,275
7,860
9,426
4,835
11,915
10,792
9,530
8,545
8,772
8,457
7,851
8,491
16,833
22962
15,644
12256
15,964
12140
8,873
8,883
8,782
22607
13,704
15,675
* 16.876 9,490
.6 10.986 13,538
1.4 16,824 12,495
19.3 14,628 11,236
2.7 13,793 10,482
3.2 10,320 10,328
13.4 16,493 11,770
.6 8,036 11,068
3.5 12097 11,331
* 19,955 10,873
3.1 11,619 11,359
1I.I 20,203 13,654
TREAS. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 112. These figures highlight that high tech-
nology companies derived more benefits from section 936 than did traditional industry
companies. Moreover, they indicate that high technology firms did not constitute a
majority of the possessions corporations.
In evaluating TEFRA, Congress failed to examine the degree to which the new rules
adversely affect so-called marginal industries. Marginal industries are those industries
that derive reasonable rather than excessive benefits from their operations in Puerto
Rico. In these industries, the average tax expenditure per employee is only slightly above
Average
Employee
Compensation
(s)
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abuse the possessions corporation system by transferring large
amounts of intangibles to their Puerto Rican subsidiaries, the new
legislation reduces the already reasonable tax benefits they derive
from operation in Puerto Rico. As a result, the new rules create
undeserved hardships for these enterprises.
2 TEFAA Amendments to Section 936- Important Revenue
Raising Devices?
Budgetary considerations played an important role in Congress'
average employee compensation. Moreover, marginal industries typically manufacture
high technology products and expend large amounts of money on research and develop-
ment. Industries in this category include companies involved in the manufacture of
instruments, machinery, and electrical equipment.
The table below lists the amounts of money spent on research and development by a
number of parent corporations in marginal industries in 1981 and compares those figures
to the amounts spent by some pharmaceutical companies in that same year.
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Net Revenue, Research and Development Expenses,
and Patents by Industry and Company, 1981
Research and Research and
Net Revenue Development Development Patents
Parent Company* Industry in Expense as a Assigned***
Millions** in Millions** Percent of
Revenue
Marginal Industries
1. Applied
Magnetics Corp.
2. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc.
3. Bell and
Howell, Inc.
4. Dataproducts
Corp.
5. Data Terminal
Systems
6. Gould, Inc.
7. Motorola, Inc.
8. Perken-Elmer
Inc.
9. Pittway Corp.
10. Ransburg
II. Storage Tech-
nology Corp.
12. Sun Electric
Corp.
13. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.
Computers &
Peripherals
Scientific
Instruments
Business
Equipment,
Instruments
& Learning
Systems
Computers &
Peripherals
Computers &
Peripherals
Electronics
Electronics
Scientific
Instruments
Electronics
Industrial
Equipment
Computers &
Peripherals
Electronics
Electronics
Pharmaceutical Companies
1. Abbott Labora-
tories, Inc.
2. American Hospi-
tal Supply, Inc.
3. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc.
4. Johnson &
Johnson, Inc.
5. Merck & Co., Inc.
6. Pfizer, Inc.
7. Schering-
Plough, Inc.
8. Upjohn Co., Inc.
9. Warner-Lambert, Inc.
73.913
618.125
701.488
268.956
122.133
1,846.100
3,335.868
1,115.830
399.227
144.570
921.963
177.405
9,367.500
2,342.524
2,870.100
2,773.205
5,399.000
2,929.455
3,249.700
1,808.800
1,898.334
3,379.952
3.431
50.193
35.489
19.100
5.787
95.900
229.00
83.476
3.280
9.127
67.227
5.471
230.000
113.655
52.400
234.809
282.900
274.168
176.900
109.100
171.606
114.789
* Each of these companies has possessions corporation
Puerto Rico.
4.6 %
8.1 %
5.1 %
7.1 %
4.7 %
5.2 %
6.9 %
7.5 %
.82%
2.1 %
7.3 %
3.1 %
2.5 %
4.9 % 64
1.8 % 34
8.5 % 112
5.2 % 21
9.36% 160
5.4 % 91
6.0 % 28
9.0 % 336
3.4 % 37
subsidiaries operating in
** See the 1981 annual reports of the companies in question.
*** This column contains the number of patents assigned to the various companies
during 1981. See U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE INDEX OF PATENTS, 1981, PART 1 (1982).
As the table indicates, marginal industries are not as intangible-intensive as the pharma-
ceutical industry. However, the marginal industries are nonetheless heavily reliant on
intangibles. They spend money on research and development and they frequently patent
their discoveries. Under the old rules, some parent companies dealing in high technology
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decision to pass new tax rules for possessions corporations.' 58 Dur-
ing 1982, Congress searched for ways to reduce a burgeoning federal
deficit.159 Given the perceived abuses associated with the transfer of
intangibles to these corporations, the rules governing such transfers
were a likely target of reform.' 60
During the legislative process, Congress emphasized the amount
of money the United States lost through intangible transfers. This
suggests that Congress perceived the new rules to be revenue-raising
devices.' 6' But by relying on the tax expenditure figures in the
Treasury Department reports,' 62 Congress implicitly assumed that
products, such as electrical equipment and instruments, transferred intangibles to their
Puerto Rican subsidiaries in an attempt to receive the tax benefits that accompany this
practice. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. The Service, however, fre-
quently challenged this practice just as it challenged the intangible transfers made by
pharmaceutical companies. On this subject, the 1981 annual report of Westinghouse
Electric Corporation states:
[t]he federal income tax returns of the Corporation and its wholly owned subsidi-
aries are settled through December 31, 1973. For 1974 and 1975 the Internal
Revenue Service has proposed income tax deficiencies of approximately $14.5
million related to reallocations to the parent company of a portion of the income
of certain domestic subsidiaries operating in Puerto Rico under tax incentive
grants. The Corporation has filed a protest against such proposed adjustments
with the office of the Regional Director of Appeals of the IRS. If similar reallo-
cations were made for subsequent years, substantial additional taxes would be
assessed for the years 1976 through 1981. Tax counsel for the Corporation has
advised that the proposed reallocations are not appropriate under the law.
Accordingly, the Corporation will vigorously contest the proposed reallocations
for 1974 and 1975 and any similar reallocations for later years. Management
believes that adequate provisions for taxes, including tax deficiencies applicable
to the ultimate resolution of the reallocation issues, have been made through
December 31, 1981.
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1981).
The new rules regulating intangible transfers apply to marginal industries as well as to
those industries that derive excessive benefits under section 936. For those marginal pos-
sessions corporations that did receive intangibles from their parents in the pre-TEFRA
period and that did obtain tax savings as a result of the transfers, the already reasonable
benefits that they derive from operating in Puerto Rico will decrease under the new rules.
Moreover, as a result of the new rules, possessions corporations that did not participate in
or benefit from intangible transfers in the pre-TEFRA period no longer have the option
to engage in this activity tax-free under section 936. The parent companies of these pos-
sessions corporations thus lost a potential source of tax savings. TEFRA unfortunately
penalizes all industries in an effort to curb the large profits the pharmaceutical companies
were deriving from Puerto Rican operations.
158. 128 CONG. REc. S8803-04 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole). The
House of Representatives report on the section 936 amendments appears with the reve-
nue provisions of TEFRA. This fact suggests that Congress viewed the new rules as
revenue-raising devices. H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 467, 504, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781, 1281-82.
159. See infra note 168.
160. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
161. See infra note 168. See also supra note 158.
162. See, e.g., 128 CONG. Rc. S8803 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Dole); TREAS. DEP'T SECOND ANN. RP., supra note 21, at 53-55; TREAS. DEP'T THIRD
ANN. REP., supra note 83, at 33, 48-49.
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but for the section 936 credit, high technology, intangible-intensive
industries would operate in the United States, would earn the same
net income earned in Puerto Rico, and would pay a United States
income tax equivalent to the tax expenditure that would arise from
operating in Puerto Rico. 163 In other words, Congress assumed that
possessions corporations would not behave differently in the absence
of section 936. This assumption of "no behavioral change" is erro-
neous. Commenting on the weakness of the "no behavioral change"
analysis, Professor Boris Bittker stated:
To be fully informative, of course, the estimates [of revenue losses] would
have to take account of the fact that tax concessions influence behavior, since
the revenue "lost" by virtue of any tax provision depends in part on what the
taxpayer would have done in its absence, its "cost" cannot be accurately
measured by merely recomputing the tax liability on the return as filed. It
might turn out that the revenue effects of tax incentive provisions, if they
succeed in their objective of altering behavior, are especially difficult to esti-
mate-although these are precisely the provisions that are most in need of
cost effectiveness studies. . . . [O]ne must ask whether the "tax expendi-
ture" label is appropriately applied to amounts computed on an assumption
about economic behavior that will often be quite unrealistic.1
64
By assuming no behavioral change, Congress failed to realize
that a given investment may be highly profitable in one location, but
unprofitable somewhere else. 165 Thus, the tax expenditure estimates
assigned to possessions corporations overstate the cost of section 936
to the United States. I66 The amount of tax expenditures that will be
163. For a discussion of the "no behavioral change" concept as it relates to the Treas-
ury Department figures, see Research Paper Three, STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF SOPHIS-
TICATED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PUERTO
Rico 19-20 (Arthur D. Little, Inc. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Research Paper Three]. See
also TREAS. DEP'T THIRD ANN. REP., supra note 83, at 33; TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP.,
supra note 4, at 2. In the Fourth Annual Report, the Treasury Department stated:
For fiscal year 1980, the reduction in U.S. Tax under the possessions corporation
system of taxation is estimated at $1.195 million. In making this estimate, it is
assumed that in the absence of section 936, the net income of all U.S. corpora-
tions in the aggregate would not change.
Id The statement indicates that the Treasury Department has employed the "no behav-
ioral change" assumption in calculating tax expenditures.
164. Bittker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L
TAX J. 244, 247 (1969).
165. Research Paper Three, supra note 163 at 19-20.
166. Id. at 20.
In the Fourth Annual Report, the Treasury Department realized that it had calculated
improperly tax expenditures in its prior Annual Reports. It believed that its tax expendi-
ture calculations underestimated the cost of section 936. TREAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP.,
supra note 4, at 124. After careful analysis, however, it becomes clear that the Depart-
ment had overestimated, rather than underestimated, section 936 tax expenditures.
On this subject, the Department stated:
In pastAnnualReports on possessions corporations, the U.S. tax benefits under
section 936 were estimated by applying the average effective U.S. corporate tax
rate to the qualified possession income of 936 corporations (except those in non-
manufacturing industries) and thus subtracting income and tollgate taxes paid to
Puerto Rico. The Treasury used 40 percent as the effective U.S. tax rate for years
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converted into a revenue gain by the United States Treasury under
the new rules remains speculative.
Moreover, the amendments are expected to raise only an addi-
tional $428 million in 1984.167 This amount is insignificant when
compared to the $98.3 billion in total additional revenue Congress
wanted to raise through this and other measures168 and to the threat
the changes pose to Puerto Rico's economic development.1 69
3. Interpretive Problems
Implementing the new tax rules leads to two interpretive
problems. First, allocating income under the profit sharing method
will be extremely difficult. Situations in which a parent company
transfers both marketing1 70 and manufacturing 71 intangibles to a
through 1978, and 38 percent as the effective U.S. tax rate for later years. These
figures were based on the average effective tax rate paid by U.S. corporations.
Use of the average effective U.S. tax rate to estimate the tax benefits of the pos-
sessions corporation system implicitly assumes that the amount of 936 assets
which, in the absence of the possessions corporation provisions, would have been
eligible for accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit, bears the
same relationship to 936 income as eligibleiU.S. assets bear to the income of U.S.
corporations as a whole. Since 936 corporations have only one-eighth as much
property, plant, and equipment in relation to their income as do corporations
operating in the United States, such an assumption results in an underestimate of
the revenue impact of section 936.
TRnAs. DEP'T FOURTH REP., supra note 4, at 123-24. To rectify the problems described
in the passage quoted above, the Department adopted a new method for calculating tax
expenditures. In its Fourth Annual Report, the Department described this new method:
Accordingly, this Report does not apply the average U.S. effective tax rate to the
qualified income of possession corporations. Instead, it estimates the 936 tax
benefits by (1) subtracting from the qualified income of possession corporations
the additional depreciation deductions which these corporations would have
enjoyed had they been eligible for the accelerated cost recovery system, and (2)
applying the U.S. statutory tax rate to the adjusted qualified income. The reve-
nue estimate which is thereby obtained is then reduced by the amount of the
investment tax credit which would have been available had the corporations
been operating in the United States, and by the tollgate and income taxes paid to
Puerto Rico.
TREAS. DEPT FoURTH REP., supra note 4, at 124. The new Treasury Department
method for calculating tax expenditures contains a basic flaw. Like the old method, it
assumes that but for section 936, United States corporations would establish subsidiaries
and more importantly, would establish them in the United States. Moreover, it also
assumes that a factory operating in the United States would be as profitable as a plant
operating in Puerto Rico. Given that the Puerto Rican Government gives section 936
corporations favorable tax treatment and that wages paid by section 936 corporations are
lower than wages paid by their United States counterparts, this assumption is erroneous.
Thus, when calculating expenditures, the Treasury Department overestimates tax
expenditures.
167. See supra note 151.
168. 128 CONG. REc. S8803 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole). See
also Merry, Congress Votes $98.3 Billion Tax Boost Over 3 Years, Bowing to Pressure
From Reagan and Budget Defcit, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1982, at 3.
169. Position Paper, supra note 82.
170. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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possessions corporation illustrate this point. Under TEFRA, posses-
sions corporations can only claim a return on manufacturing
intangibles.17 2 In situations involving the transfer of both types of
intangibles, the Service will be hard-pressed to determine the precise
return derived from each. The possessions corporation naturally will
argue that the bulk of its income arose from manufacturing
intangibles.173 The Service, on the other hand, will assert that the
bulk of the possessions corporation's income arose from marketing
intangibles. 174 Second, determining the costs of intangible develop-
ment under the cost sharing method will also be difficult. The parent
company will want to underestimate the cost of developing trans-
ferred manufacturing intangibles, because cost sharing payments
reduce a parent's research and development deductions.' 75 By
underestimating, the parent can reallocate the remaining costs to
other development projects to gain the benefit of the tax deduction.
The Service, on the other hand, will want to assign large cost figures
to the transferred intangibles and thereby minimize the parent's
research and development deductions. These interpretive problems
most certainly will give rise to much litigation.
B. THE ACTIVE TRADE OR BUSINESS REQUIREMENT
Increasing the active trade or business requirement from fifty to
sixty-five percent 176 affects only those possessions corporations that
presently derive less than sixty-five percent of their gross income
from an active trade or business. Because most possessions corpora-
tions already meet this test, the new rule serves more of a cosmetic
than a functional purpose. 177 It does, however, reinforce Congress'
intent that the possessions corporation system bolster Puerto Rico's
171. Id
172. Id
173. The possessions corporation will assert that most of its income derives from man-
ufacturing intangibles because only income attributable to these kinds of intangibles
come within the purview of the section 936 allocation amendments. Once within the
purview of the amendments, some or all of this income is eligible for the section 936
credit and thus non-taxable. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
174. The Service will want to assert this position because income from transferred
marketing intangibles does not fall within the purview of the new rules. As a result, any
income attributable to these intangibles is allocable to the parent and thus subject to
United States taxation. Id
175. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
176. See I.R.C. §§ 936(a)(2)(B)-936(a)(2)(C) (1982). See also supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
177. Arenson, The Puerto Rico Tax Revisions. Benets Are Curbed for Some, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 15, 1982, at DI, D8.
In 1980, the passive investment income of all section 936 manufacturing corporations
was approximately 15% of their total gross income. TREAs. DEP'T FouRTH REP., supra
note 4, at 123. Not surprisingly, this figure rose after 1980 because of rising interest rates
and increasing reinvestment of interest income. Id at 123 n.8. However, given the rela-
1983]
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capital structure rather than merely promote passive investment.178
Moreover, the new rule forces those corporations that do not derive
at least sixty-five percent of their gross income from an active busi-
ness within Puerto Rico to increase such activity or lose possessions
corporation status. In this sense, the new rule promotes Puerto
Rico's industrial development.
C. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE TEFRA AMENDMENTS
Two additional observations concerning the TEFRA amend-
ments warrant close scrutiny. These observations, unlike the others
previously articulated, do not deal specifically with either income
allocation or active trade requirements. Rather, they deal with the
general notion that any diminution in possessions corporation tax
benefits conflicts with United States and Puerto Rican interests.
1. The Precursor Theory
The possessions corporation system of taxation has undergone
gradual erosion over the last decade. The significant changes made
to the system in the Tax Reform Act of 1976179 and the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982180 illustrate this point. These
changes represent a dangerous trend that cannot be ignored by cor-
porations considering to elect possessions corporation status and to
establish operations in Puerto Rico. They signal a possible emascu-
lation or rescission of section 936.
The original Senate version of TEFRA' 8 l raised the active trade
or business requirement to ninety percent and allocated all income
derived from transferred intangibles to possessions corporation
shareholders. 182 The Puerto Rican Government vigorously opposed
these changes, claiming they would destroy Puerto Rico's industrial
tively small amount of investment income that possessions corporations earn, it remains
unlikely that any of them will encounter difficulty meeting the 65% requirement.
The revenue raising effects of the 65% limitation are relatively insignificant for the
1983 Fiscal year. For example, the Treasury Department projected that this limitation
would reduce section 936 tax benefits by only $15 million. Id at 122. The amount
should increase to approximately $50 million in 1988. Id
178. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. Passive investment does little to
stimulate Puerto Rico's economic development. Id
179. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1051, 90 Stat. 1525, 1643. See
supra notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
180. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 213, 96
Stat. 324, 452. See supra notes 68-109 and accompanying text.
181. See original version of the Senate's section 936 amendments, reprinted in 128
CONG. REc. § 8604 (daily ed. July 19, 1982). See also 128 CONG. REc. S8795-S8808
(daily ed. July 21, 1982); 128 CONG. REc. S8664 (daily ed. July 19, 1982) (statement of
Sen. Johnston).
182. See original version of the Senate's section 936 amendments, reprinted in 128
CONG. REc. S8604 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
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development. 8 3 Because of this fierce resistance and the interven-
tion of the United States President on the side of Puerto Rico, 84 the
Senate eventually compromised its position. The incident, however,
remains important because it reflects the vulnerability of the posses-
sions corporation system. To some extent, this vulnerability stems
from Puerto Rico's lack of representation in Congress.185 In addi-
tion, the incident suggests that Puerto Rico's ability to protect its eco-
nomic interests might grow more difficult as Congress takes steps to
meet its increasing revenue demands.
The passage of TEFRA, as well as the events surrounding it,
impugns Congress' commitment to Puerto Rico's industrial develop-
ment. Moreover, it warns industry that further changes in the pos-
sessions corporation system may be in the offing. Thus, all industries
operating or planning to operate in Puerto Rico should re-evaluate
their investment plans before taking any further action.
2. TEFRA4s Relationsh v to the Caribbean Basin Initiative
The United States has shown great concern about political
instability, economic depression, and the spread of communism in
the Caribbean region. The Caribbean Basin Initiative announced by
President Reagan in February 1982 illustrates this point.'8 6 Under
183. See, e.g., Position Paper, supra note 82; Letter from Carlos Romero-Barcel6,
Governor of Puerto Rico, to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan concerning the proposed
amendments to section 936, reprinted in 128 CONG. REc. S8802 (daily ed. July 21, 1982).
184. See Letter from President of the United States Ronald Reagan to Dan Ros-
tenkowski, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee (July 27, 1982),
reprintedin [July-Sept.] TAX NoTEs (Tax Analysis) 552 (August 9, 1982). The text of this
letter states:
I am writing to express my concern over the abrupt cutback of tax incentives
for U.S. corporations investing in Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions which
is contained in H.R. 4961, recently passed by the Senate. The tax incentives
under section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code and the related Puerto Rican
exemptions have made significant contributions to Puerto Rican economic devel-
opment. Relying upon these incentives, many U.S. corporations have made
long-term commitments to investment and employment on the island. In 1980,
these corporations directly provided over 70,000 jobs in Puerto Rico.
I do recognize that the effect of the current system may be too generous in that
some companies have enjoyed large tax benefits relative to the benefits derived
by Puerto Rico. However, the Senate bill goes much further than is necessary. It
would discourage investments in Puerto Rico which are fully consistent with the
original objectives of the possession tax incentives and are vital to the economic
development of the island. I urge you to make changes in the Senate bill which
would limit abuses of section 936 without causing severe economic distress in
Puerto Rico.
Id
185. See 128 CONG. REc. S8801 (daily ed. July 21, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
186. See Address Before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 217 (February 24, 1982). The Caribbean Basin
Initiative has been carried out through two pieces of legislation. First, on September 10,
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the Initiative, the current Administration proposes to spend hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to aid the Caribbean nations. 8 7 By pro-
viding the region with a firm economic foundation, the United States
hopes to guard against political instability and communist
encroachment. 88
There are many reasons for significant concern over the Carib-
bean. On this subject, Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, stated:
The Caribbean Basin is a region of profound interest and concern to the
United States. It is economically important to us. A good share of our trade,
especially raw materials and petroleum, passes through the Caribbean. It is
militarily important to us. It guards the access to the Panama Canal and to
the Atlantic Ocean. If hostile bases were established in the region, we would
have to engage in costly defense preparations quite different from what we
have now. The Caribbean Basin is also politically important to the United
States. The countries of the region are our neighbors. It is important to us
and to them that we all pursue positive, mutually cooperative and beneficial
relations in the region. No one gains from hostilities. 189
As Senator Percy observed, the Caribbean, in which Puerto Rico
plays a vital role, possesses economic, strategic, and political impor-
tance for the United States. An economically strong Puerto Rico
could strengthen United States efforts to blunt communist influence
by proving that free enterprise can succeed in the region. TEFRA,
however, reduces the incentives of United States corporations to
establish subsidiaries in Puerto Rico and poses a threat to the
Island's economic development. 90 Thus, the effects of the recent
section 936 amendments conflict with basic principles of the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative.
In addition, passage of TEFRA occurred at a time of height-
1982, Congress appropriated $350 million for certain Caribbean and Central American
nations. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-257, ch. VI, 96 Stat.
818, 833. The appropriation put a limit of $75 million on the amount of aid that any one
country could receive. Second, on July 28, 1983, Congress approved of another major
portion of the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative by passing the Carib-
bean Basic Economic Recovery Act. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983). President Reagan signed this legislation into law eight
days later. The Act grants preferential tariff treatment to Caribbean nations that satisfy
certain conditions. Among the more important conditions are: (1) the country cannot be
a communist country; (2) it cannot restrict imports of United States goods and services;
and (3) it cannot violate United States patent and trademark laws. Id at § 212(a)(2).
Based on 1981 trade, this legislation would allow duty-free access to the United States
market for an additional $800 million to $1 billion of Caribbean products. H.R. REP.
No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 643,
644.
187. See Address Before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 217 (February 24, 1982).
188. Id
189. 128 CONG. REc. S10068 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1982) (statement of Sen. Percy).
190. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
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ened political and social unrest in Puerto Rico. 191 Much of this
instability has stemmed from rampant unemployment. 192 Increasing
conflict between Puerto Ricans favoring statehood and those favor-
ing independence from the United States also has contributed to the
problem.1 93 Some commentators believe that these tensions could
trigger a new wave of terrorist violence in Puerto Rico. 194 TEFRA
only exacerbates the political and social tensions within an already
troubled area.
The above analysis suggests that the new possessions corpora-
tion rules deleteriously affect United States interests in the Carib-
bean. Because of the significant economic, strategic, and political
importance of these interests, Congress erred by modifying the pos-
sessions corporation system. The changes not only impinge on
Puerto Rico's industrial development 95 at a time of internal instabil-
ity, but also raise questions about United States resolve to help Car-
ibbean nations develop economically. Any of the Caribbean nations
could justifiably construe the section 936 amendments to be in con-
travention of the spirit of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
CONCLUSION
The new rules dealing with the allocation of possessions corpo-
ration income derived from transferred intangibles are harmful to
the economic development of Puerto Rico. Moreover, given the rel-
atively few possessions corporations which historically abused their
section 936 status, and the insignificant amount of revenue raised by
the new rules, the income allocation provisions are unnecessary.
Thus, Congress should not have made these changes in the posses-
sions corporation system.
Congress also should not have amended the section 936 active
trade or business requirement. In practice, this change has little
effect on the possessions corporation system, as most possessions cor-
porations already meet the sixty-five percent test. In theory, how-
ever, the new rule further erodes section 936, thereby warning
United States corporations that Congress might continue to decrease
possessions corporation benefits. The amendment therefore dis-
suades corporations from establishing operations in Puerto Rico.
191. Chaze, Once Again, Puerto Rico is a Problem Child, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
July 19, 1982, at 61.
192. See 128 CONG. Rc. E3315 (daily ed. July 19, 1982) (statement of Rep. Schulze).
193. See Chaze, supra note 191.
194. Id. "'It is despair and [a] sense of hopelessness that lead people to form Guerrilla
armies and to riot in the street."' Id (quoting Governor Carlos Romero-Barcel6).
195. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
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The section 936 amendments not only fail to deal adequately
with the problems Congress sought to address, but they also deleteri-
ously affect the economic interests of Puerto Rico. Congress should
have left section 936 unchanged.
George C. Rockas
